Thanks to Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA), we may have found another piece of the 9-11 puzzle, and it's a big one. According to a congressional Special Order from the congressman:
Mr. Speaker, I rise because information has come to my attention over the past several months that is very disturbing. I have learned that, in fact, one of our Federal agencies had, in fact, identified the major New York cell of Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11; and I have learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, that Federal agency actually was prepared to bring the FBI in and prepared to work with the FBI to take down the cell that Mohamed Atta was involved in in New York City, along with two of the other terrorists.
I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that when that recommendation was discussed within that Federal agency, the lawyers in the administration at that time said, you cannot pursue contact with the FBI against that cell. Mohamed Atta is in the U.S. on a green card, and we are fearful of the fallout from the Waco incident. So we did not allow that Federal agency to proceed. [emphasis mine - dj505]
Mr. Speaker, what this now means is that prior to September 11, we had employees of the Federal Government in one of our agencies who actually identified the Mohamed Atta cell and made a specific recommendation to act on that cell, but were denied the ability to go forward. Obviously, if we had taken out that cell, 9/11 would not have occurred and, certainly, taking out those three principal players in that cell would have severely crippled, if not totally stopped, the operation that killed 3,000 people in America.
Natch, some dems and their BM mouthpieces are attacking Weldon as some sort of kook. But it looked like he's on to something.
According to the New York Times' Douglas Jehl, an Army intelligence unit code-named Able Danger identified Mohammed Atta and three other 9-11 hijackers in the summer of 2000, more than a year before they launched their attack. The Army didn't know what Atta was planning, but they as you see from Rep. Weldon's statement, they knew he was a member of al Qaeda and recommended that data be forwarded to the FBI for action.
They were told 'no'.
You probably recall the 'wall' that 9-11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick put up when she was Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton administration (1994 - 1997). In a March 5, 1995 memo to US Attorney Mary Jo White, Director of the FBI Louis Freeh, and several other government officials, Gorelick wrote:
Because the counterintelligence investigation will involve the use of surveillance techniques authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) against targets that, in some instances, had been subject to surveillance under Title III, and because it will involve some of the same sources and targets as the criminal investigation, we believe that it is prudent to establish a set of instructions that will clearly seperate the counterintelligence investigation from the more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. The procedures, which go beyond what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation. [emphasis mine - dj505]
According the CNSNews' Scott Wheeler:
White was concerned that Gorelick's new guidelines for investigations had made it too complicated for the FBI to contact the U.S. attorney's office and launch a probe of suspicious activity. White suggested that only the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review at the Department of Justice needed to approve such an investigation, and not the department's criminal division.
However, the Vatis/Gorelick memo offered a blunt reply.
"I recommend rejecting this change," the June 19, 1995 document stated. "[A] USAO (U.S. attorney's office) should not be notified of a national security investigation -- particularly one that has not yet developed into a criminal case -- without the approval of the AAG (assistant attorney general), Criminal Division."
The Vatis/Gorelick memo also addressed White's reservations over how the new investigative guidelines would impact a probe under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). White contended that once the Justice Department's Criminal Division had decided that criminal law enforcement concerns existed in a FISA investigation, the appropriate U.S. attorney should be contacted.
Vatis rejected this notion as well.
"Notifying the USAO as soon as law enforcement concerns exist -- but before Crim. thinks that the investigation should 'go criminal' -- is simply too early," the document stated.
In this kind of legal environment, government lawyers were reluctant to allow the Army to share its counterintelligence information with DOJ, and so the Army filed away its information on Atta.
One wonders if there wasn't more than one Army intelligence officer shouting a frustrated "son of a BITCH!" on 9-11.
Now, the question becomes why the 9-11 Commission did not address the issue of ignored Army intelligence in their report. Apparently, it's because THEY DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT IT.
Apparently, the 9-11 Commission staffers WERE told, but decided that it wasn't important enough to bring to the attention of the commissioners. As Michelle Malkin notes:
According to the New York Times, the 9/11 Commission officials said that Able Danger had not been included in their report because some of the information sounded inconsistent with what they thought they knew about Atta.
In other words, the Commission staffers were told about the project but ignored it because it didn't fit their pre-conceived conclusions. [emphasis mine - dj505]
The redoubtable Captain Ed at Captain's Quarters also comments on what can only be described as a massive botch by the Commission:
First we hear that no such meeting [to discuss Able Danger] occurred. After that, the Commission says one might have occurred in October 2003 but that no one remembered it. Now we find out that the Commission had two meetings where the heard about Able Danger and its identification of Mohammed Atta, including one just before they completed their report. Instead of saying to themselves, "Hey, wait a minute -- this changes the picture substantially," and postponing the report until they could look further into Able Danger, they simply shrugged their shoulders and published what they had.
Why? Able Danger proved that at least some of the intelligence work done by the US provided the information that could have helped prevent or at least reduce the attacks on 9/11. They had identified the ringleader of the conspiracy as a terrorist agent, even if they didn't know what mission he had at the time.
What does that mean for the Commission's findings? It meant that the cornerstone of their conclusions no longer fit the facts. Able Danger showed that the US had enough intelligence to take action -- if the government had allowed law enforcement and intelligence operations to cooperate with each other. It also showed that data mining could effectively identify terrorist agents.
Captain Ed agrees with Michelle Malkin:
It ignored those facts which did not fit within its predetermined conclusions. It never bothered to mention Able Danger even one time in its final report, even though that absolutely refuted the notion that the government had no awareness that Atta constituted a terrorist threat. It endorsed the idea of data mining (which would die in Congress as the Total Information Awareness program) without ever explaining why. And while the Clinton policy of enforcing a quarantine between law enforcement and intelligence operations came under general criticism, their report never included the fact that the "wall" for which Commission member Jamie S. Gorelick had so much responsibility specifically contributed to Atta's ability to come and go as he pleased, building the teams that would kill almost 3,000 Americans. [emphasis original - dj505]
Let me state here that, while I think Gorelick had no business being on the 9-11 Commission and should never hold a place of authority in the US government again, I don't neccessarily blame her for the 'wall memo'. Her motivation - to avoid the appearance of impropriety - was not especially good, but given both the scandal-rocked administration in which she worked AND the democrat's traditional fear that the government is out to get them, it is at least understandable. Further, I'm sure that it never crossed her mind that her memo would keep different parts of the government from cooperating on REALLY important things.(1) I'm willing to believe that she simply underestimated the stupidity of the bureaucracy and the natural tendency of bureaucrats, no matter how intelligent or well-intentioned, to play it strictly by the rules to avoid sticking their own necks out.
Hopefully, people in the government concerned with counterterrorism have learned that they MUST be willing to bend the rules now and then.
Oh, and doesn't this make you wonder anew WHAT was in those documents that Sandy Berger stole and destroyed?
(1) Let's face it: this is a Hollywood cliche. Some bright officer or civil servant in the Pentagon or the CIA sees some intelligence that he thinks should be brought to the attention of the FBI or even the president, but 'the rules' say he can't go outside his own department. Fortunately, he has an old college buddy who works in the Director's office or has the ear of a presidential aide. Over lunch, he lowers his voice and says, "I shouldn't tell you this, because it would mean my job if it got out. But SOMEBODY'S gotta tell the president about ..."
Then Jack Ryan or Bruce Willis swings into action and thwarts the nasty ol' terrorist plan with 2 seconds left on the clock.
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